光华讲坛——社会名流与企业家论坛第6614期
主题：小型银行破产的影响：来自中国的证据The Consequences of a Small Bank Collapse: Evidence from China
主讲人：清华大学五道口金融学院副教授、国家金融研究院货币政策与金融稳定研究中心副主任 周臻
主持人：771771威尼斯.Cm中国金融研究院副院长 董青马教授
时间：11月2日 10:00—11:30
举办地点：柳林校区格致楼618
主办单位：金融学院 中国金融研究院 科研处
主讲人简介：
周臻，清华大学五道口金融学院副教授，国家金融研究院货币政策与金融稳定研究中心副主任。纽约大学经济学博士。现阶段的主要研究领域是信息经济学的理论研究以及其在金融中介与银行监管、公司金融、宏观经济等领域的运用，在 American Economic Review，Journal of Economic Theory，Games and Economic Behavior 等一流学术期刊上发表过多篇论文。研究成果曾经获得中国信息经济学会优秀成果奖，PwC 3535 论坛年度最佳论文等荣誉，并入选国家高层次人才（青年）计划。
内容简介：
包商银行破产的处置过程中，我国监管部门首次未对中小银行进行完全救助和担保。本文考察了该例监管首次偏离了市场的长期刚性兑付预期处置的影响。基于双重差分法，本文研究发现，包商银行事件后，在同业存单市场，相比于系统重要性银行，非系统重要性银行（中小银行）的融资成本（信用利差）显著增加，同时融资比率下降。包商银行事件导致的非系统重要性银行融资困难具有显著性和持久性，并引起部分中小银行（如锦州银行、恒丰银行等）陷入融资困境。从事后角度分析，包商银行事件引起了风险传染，且可能一定程度上影响金融系统稳定。本文探索了其中的传染机制，发现包商银行事件降低了市场对未来政府救助非系统重要性银行的信心。从事前角度分析，消除市场隐形担保预期有助于提高定价效率、改善信贷分配。相比于系统重要性银行，非系统重要性银行股票价格下跌、债权人的监督意愿提高以及风险承担降低。
Upon assuming control of Baoshang Bank, Chinese bank regulators announced that they would eschew bailing out large creditors of this city-level distressed bank in full. This paper investigates the consequences of this unexpected deviation from the long-standing full bailout policy. Employing a difference-in-differences methodology, we find that this event significantly increased credit spreads and decreased the funding ratio of negotiable certificates of deposit (NCD) issued by systemically unimportant (SU) banks relative to those issued by systemically important(SI) banks. The deterioration of funding conditions for other SU banks is economically significant and persistent, resulting in the distress of those small banks. We provide additional evidence to show that the underlying mechanism of this contagion and ex post financial instability is a decline in market confidence regarding future bailouts for SU banks. Ex-ante, however, it is found that the induced implicit non- guarantee improves price efficiency and credit allocation, lowers equity prices, strengthens creditors' monitoring, and reduces the risk-taking among SU banks relative to SI banks. Finally, additional evidence on credit line extension and utilization is presented to illustrate the real effects of this contagion caused by the unanticipated bailout policy change.
