光华讲坛——社会名流与企业家论坛第6615期
主题：通货膨胀目标区间有助于还是妨碍价格稳定？
主讲人：特伦托大学 Roberto Tamborini
主持人：经济与管理研究院 吴季教授
时间：10月26日 14:00—16:00
举办地点：771771威尼斯.Cm柳林校区格致楼1211
主办单位：经济与管理研究院 国际交流与合作处 科研处
主讲人简介：
Roberto Tamborini教授在1991年获得了欧洲大学学院的经济学博士学位，目前在特伦托大学经济与管理系担任经济学教授，同时也是欧洲政治经济学院的研究员和欧洲议会货币对话专家委员会的成员。他的主要研究领域包括宏观经济理论与政策、货币与金融经济学以及欧洲经济政策，产出了约90项科研出版物，他的文章发表在Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Journal of Common Market Studies,Open Economies Review, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Metroeconomica, Giornale degli Economisti, Rivista Italiana degli Economisti, Applied Economics, Economics, Economica, Oxford Economic Papers及Journal of Macroeconomics。
Roberto Tamborini obtained his Ph.D. in Economics at the European University Institute, Florence in 1991. His current position is professor of Economics at the Department of Economics and Management of the University of Trento. He is also a fellow of the School of European Political Economy, LUISS 'Guido Carli', Rome, and a member of the Board of Experts of the Monetary Dialogues of the European Parliament. His main research fields are Macroeconomic theories and policies, Monetary and financial economics, and European economic policy. He has produced about 90 publications of monographs, contributions to collective books, and articles in refereed journals: such as Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Journal of Common Market Studies, Open Economies Review, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Metroeconomica, Giornale degli Economisti, Rivista Italiana degli Economisti, Applied Economics, Economics, Economica, Oxford Economic Papers, Journal of Macroeconomics.
内容简介：
本次讲座的研究聚焦于通货膨胀目标制度的中央银行，尤其是采用通货膨胀区间目标的中央银行，包括最近的美联储和欧洲央行。他们的目标是将通货膨胀率保持在官方目标的范围内，并在通货膨胀表现出偏离这一范围的迹象时进行干预。研究的主要问题在于采用通货膨胀目标区间（ITZ）是否有助于或妨碍中央银行实现价格稳定。研究受已有文献的启发，展示了通货膨胀目标区间使中央银行能够在干预之前处理更大的冲击，并在干预时设定更低的利率水平。但如果市场参与者对通货膨胀目标区间的范围存在不确定性，这些好处将会销售。该研究有助于更加深入地理解中央银行在通货膨胀控制方面的策略和决策，以及通货膨胀目标区间对经济稳定性的影响。
A significant number of central banks that have adopted inflation targeting can also be classified as inflation-zone targeters, with the recent inclusion of the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. They aim to keep inflation within a range centered on the official target and intervene only to the extent that inflation shows a tendency to move out of that range. We ask whether the adoption of an inflation target zone (ITZ) would help or hinder the central bank's achievement of price stability. Through a model inspired by previous literature on exchange rate target zones, we show that the ITZ allows the central bank to handle larger shocks before intervening and to set a lower interest rate at the point of intervention. However, these benefits are reversed if market agents are uncertain about the width of the ITZ.
